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We study the structure of heterosexual dating markets in the United States through an analysis of
the interactions of several million users of a large online dating web site, applying recently developed
network analysis methods to the pattern of messages exchanged among users. Our analysis shows
that the strongest driver of romantic interaction at the national level is simple geographic proximity,
but at the local level other demographic factors come into play. We find that dating markets in
each city are partitioned into submarkets along lines of age and ethnicity. Sex ratio varies widely
between submarkets, with younger submarkets having more men and fewer women than older ones.
There is also a noticeable tendency for minorities, especially women, to be younger than the average
in older submarkets, and our analysis reveals how this kind of racial stratification arises through the
messaging decisions of both men and women. Our study illustrates how network techniques applied
to online interactions can reveal the aggregate effects of individual behavior on social structure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Patterns of romantic and sexual partnerships—who
pairs with whom—have broad implications for health and
society. For example, the level of assortative mating (the
extent to which like pairs with like) has long been consid-
ered an indicator of societal openness [1, 2]. Mating pat-
terns also determine how wealth and resources are passed
from one generation to another, and hence persistence or
change in inequality over time [3, 4], have implications for
mental and physical health [5, 6], and shape the sexual
networks that drive the spread of sexually transmitted
infections [7, 8].
There exists an extensive empirical and theoretical lit-
erature exploring the mechanisms behind patterns of ro-
mantic pairing [9, 10]. In societies where people choose
their own mates, it is widely accepted that romantic pair-
ing is driven by the interplay between individuals’ pref-
erences for partners and the composition of the pool of
potential mates [11–13]. The process can be modeled
game theoretically as a market in which individuals aim
to find the best match they can subject to the preferences
of others [14, 15]. There is also a large body of empirical
work that documents the relationship between observed
partnering patterns and the supply of partners, as re-
flected in the population composition of cities, regions,
or countries [16–25].
These studies are limited, however, in what they can
reveal about the structure of dating or marriage mar-
kets. One issue is that we typically do not have access
to the actual population of available dating partners and
must instead make do with proxies such as census data,
obliging us to treat entire towns or cities as a single undif-
ferentiated market. A more fundamental problem is that
previous studies have only looked at extant partnerships,
and not the larger set of all courtship interactions among
mate-seeking individuals. In order to properly study dat-
ing markets, one needs data on all courtship overtures
that occur within the focal population, not only those
that are successful and result in a partnership but also
those that are rejected. As we show in this paper, the
complete set of such overtures forms a connected network
whose structure can be analyzed to reveal key features of
romantic markets.
Unfortunately, complete data on courtship interactions
have been historically hard to come by because unre-
quited overtures are rarely documented. The few em-
pirical studies that have directly observed courtship pat-
terns have tended to focus narrowly on specific institu-
tions, subpopulations, or geographic locations [26, 27],
and relatively little is known about the empirical struc-
ture of romantic and sexual markets across the general
population or how this structure varies from one locale
to another.
The advent of online dating and its spectacular rise in
popularity over the last two decades has, however, cre-
ated a new opportunity to study courtship behaviors in
unprecedented detail [28]. Here we report on a quanti-
tative study of the structure of adult romantic relation-
ship markets in the United States using nationwide data
on online dating users and their behaviors. We com-
bine activity data for millions of participants with re-
cently developed network analysis methods to shed light
on the features of relationship markets at the largest
scales. There have been recent studies using early-stage
patterns of online mate choice—who browses, contacts,
or responds to whom—to shed light on individuals’ pref-
erences for mates [29–32], but the work presented here
goes beyond these studies to examine how individuals’
choices aggregate collectively to create structured rela-
tionship markets that strongly influence individuals’ dat-
ing experiences.
II. RESULTS
The data we analyze come from a popular US online
dating web site with over 4 million active users at the
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2time of our study. The data are described in detail in
Section IV A and Appendix A. Our analysis focuses on
all (self-identified) heterosexual, single men and women
who sent or received at least one message on the site
during the period of observation, January 1 to 31, 2014,
and who indicated that they were pursuing some form
of romantic relationship (long-term dating, short-term
dating, and/or sex). For each user we have a range
of self-reported personal characteristics along with time-
stamped records of all messages exchanged on the site.
It is the latter that are the primary focus of our anal-
ysis, since it is the messaging patterns that reveal the
aggregate demand for individuals within the market.
We quantify messaging patterns using methods of net-
work analysis [33]. We examine the set of all reciprocal
interactions between opposite-sex users, meaning pairs
of individuals such that at least one message was sent in
each direction between the pair. Reciprocal interactions
we take to be a signal of a baseline level of mutual interest
between potential dating partners. Our primary focus is
on understanding the division of the online dating pop-
ulation into distinct submarkets: how does the market
divide into subpopulations of daters and how are those
subpopulations characterized? We define submarkets as
roughly self-contained groups of individuals within the
network such that most reciprocal exchange of messages
occurs within groups. This corresponds closely to the es-
tablished concept of “community structure” in network
theory, a community in this context being a tightly knit
subgroup of individuals within a larger network. A num-
ber of sensitive techniques for the detection of network
communities have been developed in recent years [34],
and we employ a selection of those techniques here. Tech-
nical details of the algorithmic methods used in our cal-
culations are given in Section IV B and Appendix B.
A. Dating markets are divided into distinct
geographic regions
For our first analysis, we examine community struc-
ture within the entire data set of all users of the web site
during the month of observation. A total of 15 302 512
reciprocal interactions took place during this period. We
aggregate these interactions at the level of 3-digit ZIP
codes—geographic regions used by the US Post Office—
and count the number of interactions that take place
between every pair of 3-digit ZIPs. For instance, there
were 75 686 reciprocal interactions between individuals in
Manhattan and individuals in neighboring Brooklyn, but
only 2170 interactions between individuals in Manhattan
and individuals in far-away San Francisco.
The result of this aggregation is a weighted network
in which the nodes represent 3-digit ZIP code regions
and the weighted edges represent the number of inter-
actions. We take this network and perform a standard
community detection analysis on it using the modularity
maximization method (see Section IV B and Appendix B
FIG. 1: Division of the messaging network for the lower 48
states into 19 communities by modularity maximization. Col-
ors represent communities at the level of 3-digit ZIP codes.
Gray regions are areas with no assigned ZIP code.
for details). The results for the lower 48 states are shown
in map form in Fig. 1.
As the figure shows, the communities found in this
nationwide network of messaging are tightly geographi-
cally circumscribed. Many of them appear to correspond
to commonly accepted geographic divisions of the coun-
try: New England, the East Coast, the South, Texas,
the Mountain West, North and South California, and so
forth. In essence the analysis says that most people are
interested in others who are in their own region of the
country, which is reasonable. Few people living in New
York will exchange messages with people across the coun-
try in California if the primary goal is to arrange a face-
to-face meeting with a possible romantic partner [35].
This finding is consistent with recent work looking at
friendship communities using Facebook data, which finds
that incidence of friendship is strongly decreasing with
geographic distance [36, 37].
Community structure in the broad, nationwide net-
work of messaging thus appears to be dominated by geo-
graphic effects. Since our primary goal here is to observe
and analyze more subtle demographic effects within dat-
ing markets, we need to factor out the gross influence of
geography. Our approach for doing this is a simple one:
we focus on subnetworks within individual cities. We
choose cities as our basic unit of analysis because they
are large enough to provide a population of significant
size, yet small enough that travel distance between in-
dividuals will not be a deterrent to interaction. In the
remainder of this paper we perform a series of analy-
ses on subsets of the data corresponding to four large
cities: New York, Boston, Chicago, and Seattle. We de-
fine cities using the standard Core-based Statistical Areas
(CBSAs) for the corresponding metropolitan regions, ex-
cept for New York, where the CBSA is large enough that
there are clearly separate dating markets within it. For
New York we therefore define our area of study more nar-
3rowly to be the five boroughs of Manhattan, the Bronx,
Queens, Brooklyn, and Staten Island.
B. Dating markets are demographically stratified
within cities
Community structure at the city level is more com-
plex than the simple geographic effects we saw in Fig. 1.
Specifically, it displays a mix of so-called assortative and
disassortative mixing [38]. For the heterosexual dat-
ing communities studied here it is disassortative by gen-
der, meaning most messages are between individuals of
opposite sex, but assortative by various other charac-
teristics, as we will see. It is the latter behavior on
which we primarily focus, but our community detec-
tion calculations need to be sensitive to both in order
to fully reveal the structure of the market. Here we
make use of a powerful and flexible community detection
method based on maximum-likelihood techniques, the
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm, and belief
propagation [39, 40], which can sensitively and rapidly
detect complex forms of structure in large networks. For
details of the method see Appendix B.
Focusing again on networks of two-way message ex-
changes, we present in the following analyses the results
of community divisions of each city network into four sep-
arate communities or submarkets (or eight if you count
men and women separately). We find that about 75% of
all reciprocal interactions in our four cities are between
individuals within the same submarket, indicating that
the communities align well with the conventional defini-
tion: tightly-knit groups with most interaction going on
within groups. The choice to divide into four submarkets
is to some extent arbitrary. We have repeated the analy-
sis for other numbers of submarkets and find essentially
similar patterns to those reported here—see Appendix B.
The choice of four submarkets offers a good compromise
between resolution of finer details and adequate statisti-
cal power within submarkets.
Figure 2 shows a variety of demographic features of the
submarkets in the four cities. The most obvious defining
feature of the submarkets is the age of their members,
shown in Fig. 2A. The youngest submarket, numbered 1
in each city, corresponds primarily to individuals in their
lower 20s, while submarkets 2 to 4 correspond respec-
tively to upper 20s, 30s, and 40s and above. This pat-
tern is consistent, with only minor variation, across the
four cities. As the figure shows, there is a small but sys-
tematic difference in age between men and women across
all submarkets: in every case the men are older than the
women, with a median age difference of 1 year and 7
months.
However, submarkets are not characterized by age
alone. As Fig. 2B shows, they also differ in male-to-
female ratio, and here we see another consistent pat-
tern: the younger submarkets tend to be male-heavy but
the mix becomes progressively more female-heavy in the
older submarkets. There are a number of factors that
may drive this pattern. Women’s first marriages are at a
younger age on average than men’s [41, 42], which takes
more women than men out of younger dating markets.
Furthermore, since partnering of younger women with
older men is more common than the reverse [29, 43], some
older men may seek out younger partners, swelling the
ranks of men in the younger submarkets. Conversely,
some younger women may leave the youngest submar-
kets in search of older partners, depleting the supply of
women. (This would also help explain the higher average
age of men in each submarket.) The same behaviors also
reduce the number of men in the older submarkets and
increase the number of women. Depending on the overall
population balance of the city, the end result can be a se-
vere distortion of the sex ratio at the oldest or youngest
ages. The youngest submarkets in Chicago and Seattle,
for example, have almost two men for every woman.
A further facet of the submarket structure, one that
affects predominantly women, comes to light when we
look at the balance of ethnicities. Figure 2C shows the
mean age of minority women in each submarket broken
down by ethnicity and measured, in this case, relative
to the mean age of white women in the same submar-
ket. The plot demonstrates a systematic tendency for
minority women to be younger than their white counter-
parts within the same submarket. The effect is small in
the younger submarkets but becomes more pronounced
in the older ones. This is partly due to the fact that there
are fewer black women than white women among the old-
est users of the site (see Appendix C, Fig. 7), but these
compositional effects are not large enough to account for
the pronounced age difference seen in Fig. 2C. Studies of
mate preferences of online daters have shown that black
women are on average viewed by heterosexual men as less
desirable partners than nonblack women [29, 30, 44, 45],
and the behavior seen in Fig. 2C may reflect the aggre-
gate outcome of such preferences at the submarket level.
In Chicago’s oldest submarket, for instance, black women
are more than eight years younger on average than white
women, suggesting that men in that submarket are ex-
changing messages with black women who are substan-
tially younger than the white women they exchange mes-
sages with [46].
C. Dating markets reflect the aggregated choices of
individuals
Next we examine how the choices of men and women
about whom to message differ across submarkets, and
by gender. Since men send more than 80% of first mes-
sages on the site, we focus on men’s first messages and
women’s replies. Figure 3 shows the difference between
the age of men and the women they message, by sub-
market and race, in Chicago and New York, in the form
of “heat maps.” (Similar results for Boston and Seattle
are shown in Appendix C, Fig. 8.) The rows labeled “1st
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FIG. 2: (A) Distribution of ages of men and women in each submarket in each of the four cities studied. Boxes indicate 25th,
50th, and 75th percentiles; whiskers indicate 9th and 91st. (B) Percentage of men and women in each submarket, and overall,
for each city. (C) Average age of minority women in each submarket by ethnicity, measured relative to average age of white
women in the same submarket. Units of analysis are users.
messages” show age difference in first messages, and the
rows labeled “Replies” show the age difference in replies,
with brighter colors corresponding to larger age differ-
ences. We see that in both Chicago and New York the
age differences between men and the women they mes-
sage are approximately two to three times larger in the
oldest submarket than in the youngest. This is consis-
tent with previous work showing that men’s preferences
for partners become more pronounced as they age [47].
Figure 3 also sheds light on the behavioral mechanisms
driving the racial stratification patterns we observed in
Fig. 2C. The top two rows of the figure for Chicago re-
veal that white men in older submarkets pursue minority
women who are on average two or more years younger
than the white women they message. This is especially
pronounced in submarket 4, where the average age gap
between white men and the minority women they write
to is around five to six years, compared to two years
for white women. However, minority women tend not
to reciprocate overtures from older white men, which is
why the age gap in replies among minority and white
women is not as pronounced. The one exception is for
black women in Chicago: the average age gap in messages
between these women and the white men they respond
to is around 5.8 years. Thus it is both how men pick
the women they message and also how women reply that
drives the racial stratification we saw in Fig. 2C.
In New York the messaging patterns look somewhat
different from Chicago because New York men, despite
being of similar age to their Chicago counterparts, pursue
younger women on average. Black men in the oldest New
York submarket write to women who are on average 4.5
years younger than they are, while for white men the cor-
responding figure is 6.2 years. And while older white men
in New York message younger black and Asian women
than white women, the differences are slight: women of
all races in New York’s submarket 4 are being pursued
at younger ages, so the racial difference is more attenu-
ated. In other words, it’s not that black women in New
York’s oldest submarket receive messages from younger
men than black women in Chicago’s oldest submarket
(i.e., men closer to their own age), but that white women
in New York’s oldest submarket receive messages from
older men than white women in Chicago’s oldest sub-
market. Overall, we see that men and women’s choices
about who to message and respond to shape submarket
structure differently in the two cities.
Additional features of interest in the submarket struc-
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FIG. 3: Mean difference in years between the age of men
of varying races in Chicago and New York (vertical axis) and
the women they message, by race of women and by submarket
(horizontal axis). Race is coded as A = Asian, B = black, H
= Hispanic, and W = white. The first two rows show the
average age difference for, respectively, all initial messages
sent by men in Chicago and those that received a reply. The
bottom two rows show the same patterns for New York. In
both cities the age gap between men and their potential mates
increases (lighter colors) as we move from younger to older
submarkets. In addition, we see that black and white men
in the oldest New York submarket pursue younger women,
on average, than black and white men in the oldest Chicago
submarket. However, unlike in Chicago, only Asian women
are pursued by older black men in New York at substantially
younger ages than their non-Asian counterparts. White men
in the oldest submarket pursue both Asian and black women
at younger ages, compared to Hispanic and white women.
ture are revealed by an examination of messaging pat-
terns within and between submarkets. For this analysis
we focus on initial contacts between individuals and on
whether those contacts receive a reply. Across all sub-
markets and cities, we find that 57% of first contacts
are between users in the same submarket. The remain-
ing 43% are between users in different submarkets and
the pattern of within- and between-group messages, de-
picted in Fig. 4, shows a number of interesting regular-
ities. The first and third rows of the figure show data
for initial contacts made by men and women respectively.
The bright squares down the diagonal of each matrix rep-
resent the large fraction of within-group contacts. The
darker squares off the diagonal show that users are send-
ing a modest number of messages to the submarkets im-
mediately older and younger than their own, but very few
messages to submarkets two or more steps away. One de-
viation from this pattern is visible in the messages sent by
men in submarket 3 (the 30-somethings). Across all four
of our cities, this group is the only one whose members
send a majority of their messages to women in differ-
FIG. 4: Fraction of messages sent, and fraction that receive
a reply, for messages from men to women (top two rows) and
women to men (bottom two rows) in each of the four cities
studied. Brighter colors indicate larger numbers of messages.
ent submarkets from their own, the largest number going
to women in the next youngest submarket, submarket 2
(mid-to-late 20s).
The second and fourth rows of Fig. 4 give the frac-
tion of first messages that receive a reply—establishing
a possible reciprocal interest between the individuals in
question. Women’s replies to messages sent by men (sec-
ond row) occur at a substantially lower rate than men’s
replies to women (fourth row), which is likely a volume
effect: since women receive four times as many first mes-
sages as men, they can afford to be more selective in their
replies. Again, across all cities and among both men
and women, reply rates are highest within submarkets.
Women receive replies more often when initiating con-
tact with men in older submarkets compared to younger
ones (which is consistent with prior studies), although
there are some exceptions. Notice for instance that in all
cities women in the oldest submarket (submarket 4) are—
surprisingly—more likely to receive a reply from men in
the youngest submarket (submarket 1) than in the second
youngest (submarket 2).
III. DISCUSSION
The experience of mate selection is frequently de-
scribed, both in popular discourse and in the scientific
literature, in the language of markets: an individual’s
goal is to secure the best possible mate for themselves in
the face of competition from others. However, we know
little about the structure of these romantic markets in
part for lack of appropriately detailed data. The advent
and vigorous growth of the online dating industry in the
6last two decades provides a new source of data about
courtship interactions on an unprecedented scale.
In this study, we have provided a first look at how net-
work analysis techniques can reveal the structure of US
dating markets as evidenced by interactions on a pop-
ular online dating website. Across the US as a whole,
we find that geography is the defining feature of national
dating markets. Within cities, submarkets are defined by
age as well as other demographic factors—most notably,
race. We find that submarket structure is shaped by both
first messaging patterns and replies. Three-quarters of all
reciprocated messages fall within submarkets and only
a quarter between individuals in different submarkets.
A larger fraction, about 43%, of all first messages are
between different submarkets, which indicates that peo-
ple do attempt to contact partners outside of their sub-
markets, but that those attempts are often unsuccessful.
Overall, our results reveal the aggregate implications of
individuals’ mate choices, and suggest that metropolitan
areas are best characterized as a collection of geograph-
ically integrated but demographically distinct submar-
kets.
More generally, our study illustrates how state-of-the-
art network science techniques can be applied to rich
data from online interactions or administrative records
to reveal subtle features of social structure. In recent
years the growing availability of search data from online
sources has led to interest in how individuals’ choices
reveal submarkets in other social domains [48, 49]. As
we have shown in the dating context, market outcomes
reflect the choices made by actors on both sides (e.g.,
men and women in heterosexual dating markets, workers
and firms in job markets). Our approach could straight-
forwardly be extended to look at structural features of
housing or job markets, and we view this as a fruitful
direction for future work.
IV. MATERIALS AND METHODS
A. Data
The data used as the starting point for our study come
from one of the largest free dating sites in the United
States and were collected in July 2014. The site does not
market itself to any particular demographic group and
attracts a diverse population of users whose makeup, in
most locales, corresponds loosely to that of the general
population. The site is known for its user-driven match-
ing algorithm, which reduces the effect of site interfer-
ence on users’ mate choice behavior. The population of
users is concentrated in coastal areas, although there are
significant numbers of users in major Midwestern cities
such as Chicago. We restrict our analysis to active users,
which we define to mean that they sent or received at
least one message on the site during the observation pe-
riod, which was January 1 to 31, 2014. This eliminates a
significant number of users who sign up and use the site
but then become inactive, or who sign up and never use
it. We also remove from the data all users who identify
as gay or bisexual (about 14% of the overall user base of
the site) and those who indicate that they are not look-
ing for romantic relationships. (People can indicate, for
example, that they are only looking for friendship or ac-
tivity partners.) Further description of the data is given
in Appendix A.
B. Community detection
The primary technical tool employed in our analysis
is community detection [34], which takes a network of
nodes and the connections, or edges, between them—
users and messages in the present context—and divides
it into tightly knit groups such that most edges fall within
groups and few fall between. The most widely used
method for community detection is modularity maxi-
mization [34, 50], which makes use of the standard qual-
ity function known as modularity [51]. This function,
defined as the fraction of edges within groups minus the
expected fraction of such edges if edges are placed at ran-
dom, is large and positive for divisions of a network into
good communities and small for poor divisions. Modu-
larity maximization finds good communities by looking
for the division with the largest modularity score. In our
analysis of the complete, nationwide network of messages
between active users, Fig. 1, we make use of modularity
maximization on the weighted network of conversations
between users in different 3-digit ZIP codes. There are a
range of practical methods for performing the maximiza-
tion itself. In our calculations, we use the Louvain algo-
rithm of Blondel et al. [52], which is an iterative greedy
algorithm that has been shown to give high-quality re-
sults with short run times [53]. We use the implemen-
tation from the Gephi network analysis package, with
resolution parameter equal to 0.65, which results in the
19-community division shown in Fig. 1.
Though it is fast and gives good results, modularity
maximization is not ideal for the community analysis of
our individual city networks. This is because, as dis-
cussed in Section II B, these networks contain both as-
sortative and disassortative structure. Modularity max-
imization is normally capable only of detecting assorta-
tive structure. For this part of our analysis, therefore, we
use an alternative community detection method based on
maximum-likelihood fitting of a generative, community-
structured network model, the degree-corrected stochas-
tic block model [39]. In this approach one defines a model
that generates networks with community structure, then
fits that model to the observed network. The parameters
of the best fit tell us which nodes of the network belong
to which communities. More specifically they give us
the posterior probability that each node belongs to each
community; in the final stage of the calculation we as-
sign every node to the community for which it has highest
probability of membership. The fitting itself is performed
7using an EM algorithm, with the E-step carried out us-
ing belief propagation [40]. Technical details are given
in Appendix B. Code is available upon request from the
authors.
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Appendix A: Data
Our data come from a popular, free online dating site.
New users of the site begin by creating a profile, which in-
cludes various socio-demographic information, and they
can also answer a set of open-ended essay questions that
ask them to describe who they are and what they are
looking for. The only information a user is required to
give is their login handle, age, sexual orientation, rela-
tionship status, and a 5-digit ZIP code identifying their
location. After creating a profile, users can then view
the profiles of others, as well as send and receive mes-
sages. Unlike other dating sites, that are largely driven
by a matching algorithm, this site allows users to pursue
mates relatively freely according to their own preferences.
1. Metropolitan areas
Our city-level results are based on data from four
metropolitan areas—New York, Boston, Chicago, and
Seattle. In the case of Boston, Chicago, and Seattle, we
find a good choice of boundaries to be the standard Core
Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs) established by the Of-
fice of Management and Budget [54]. For New York, how-
ever, the data clearly indicate multiple geographic dating
markets within the larger metro area. Instead, therefore,
we choose a narrower set of geographic boundaries for
New York, the five boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn,
Queens, the Bronx, and Staten Island.
9New York Boston Chicago Seattle
Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
Total number of users 44 009 50 618 9 113 9 355 28 635 23 236 12 721 9 248
Ethnicity (%)
Asian 8 11 4 6 3 4 7 9
Black 9 9 6 6 7 9 4 3
Hispanic 10 8 3 3 8 7 3 3
White 73 73 87 85 81 80 87 85
College degree (%) 92 96 70 80 63 71 64 68
Children at home (%) 5 6 7 10 7 10 15 17
Mean age 31.6 31.5 30.4 30.3 31.4 32 32.7 33.1
Mean messages sent 23.3 9.4 14.6 6.3 19 10.2 12.4 7.8
Replies received (%) 15 34 17 37 18 40 20 45
TABLE I: User attributes for four metropolitan areas. Reproduced from Ref. [55].
2. Summary statistics
Table I provides summary statistics of users in each of
the four cities, broken out by gender. As discussed in
Section II B, the cities vary in the ratio of men to women
on the web site, New York having the largest fraction
of women, followed by Boston, Chicago, and Seattle, in
that order. Recall that in Fig. 2B we found the older
submarkets to be more female-heavy, while the younger
submarkets tended to be male-heavy. Examination of
the age distribution of men and women in each city [55]
suggests that this is not merely a result of age-specific
sex ratios in the overall user population. New York, for
instance, has a surplus of women, which is most pro-
nounced among younger users in their mid twenties, yet
the submarkets for younger users still have significantly
more men than women. (The remaining cities all have
an overall surplus of men, which is most pronounced in
the later 20s and early 30s.) These observations suggest
that the submarket sex ratios observed in Fig. 2B are
driven by users’ mate seeking behavior, and not broader
population demographics.
In addition to the sex ratios, Table I also shows that
cities differ in their overall market size and composition.
New York is the largest market, followed by Chicago,
Seattle, and Boston. We also observe some variation in
the average number of initial contacts made by men and
women in each city, as well as their reply rates. Con-
sistent with other work [29–31], we see that men send
more messages than women. However, men have a lower
chance than women of receiving replies to their messages.
Appendix B: Network analysis
As described in Section II, the starting point for our
results is community structure analysis of networks of re-
ciprocated messaging between pairs of individuals. Our
city-level analyses are restricted to the largest connected
component of the network for each city, although in prac-
tice this has little effect since nearly everyone belongs to
the largest component. In the network for New York,
for example, the largest connected component contains
99.8% of all users.
Our analysis of the full, nationwide messaging net-
work in Fig. 1 is based on standard modularity max-
imization, as described in Section IV B. The structure
within our individual city networks, however, is more
complicated, being partly assortative (with respect to
submarket) but also partly disassortative (with respect
to gender, since most messages are between a man and
a woman). To correctly detect and classify this kind
of mixed structure we need a more flexible detection
method. The leading such method is the statistical infer-
ence method based on fitting the network to a stochas-
tic block model [39, 40, 56, 57], which is the approach
we employ in this work. Specifically, we use the degree-
corrected stochastic block model [39], which is a gener-
ative model of a random community-structured network
as follows.
Let n be the number of nodes in the observed network
(a number typically in the thousands or tens of thousands
for the networks studied here). The degree-corrected
block model allows us to create a model network of the
same size by first generating n nodes, numbered from 1
to n, each of which is assigned to one of k communities
or submarkets. The communities are numbered from 1
to k, and nodes are assigned to communities indepen-
dently at random, with probability γr of being assigned
to community r, where the γr are parameters we choose,
subject to the normalization constraint
k∑
r=1
γr = 1. (B1)
When all nodes have been assigned to communities, edges
are placed at random between pairs of nodes, indepen-
dently but with probabilities that depend on the commu-
nities to which the nodes belong, such that when all edges
have been placed the number falling between any pair
of nodes i, j is Poisson distributed with mean didjωrs,
where r and s are, respectively, the communities to which
nodes i and j belong, ωrs are parameters that we choose,
and di is the degree of node i in the observed network
that we are fitting (i.e., it is the number of connections
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node i has to other nodes). The inclusion of di is what
distinguishes this “degree-corrected” model from other
forms of the stochastic block model. As we will see, the
degree correction fixes the expected degree of every node
within the model to be equal to the observed degree of
the same node in the data, allowing the model to give
significantly better fits to empirical data.
This defines the “forward” process of generating a ran-
dom network given the parameters γ, ω of the model. Us-
ing the model for community detection involves the in-
verse process of fitting the model to observed data so as to
determine the values of the parameters that give the best
fit. This we do by the method of maximum likelihood.
Our undirected network of two-way communication be-
tween web site users is represented by an adjacency ma-
trix A with elements aij = 1 if there is an edge between
nodes i and j and zero otherwise. It is straightforward
to show that the probability, or likelihood, of generating
the observed network from the model, for given values of
the parameters γ, ω, is
P (A|γ, ω) =
∑
c
P (A, c|γ, ω) =
∑
c
eL (c), (B2)
where c denotes the complete set of community assign-
ments {ci} and the log-likelihoodL (c) = logP (A, c|γ, ω)
of generating a particular set of community assignments
and edges is given by
L (c) =
∑
ij
[
aij logωci,cj − didjωci,cj
]
=
∑
ijrs
δci,rδcj ,s
[
aij logωrs − didjωrs
]
, (B3)
where δrs is the Kronecker delta and we have neglected
additive and multiplicative constants independent of the
parameters, since they have no effect on the position of
the likelihood maximum.
1. Expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm
To find the values of the parameters γ and ω most
likely to have generated the observed network we wish to
maximize Eq. (B2) with respect to the parameters. Di-
rect maximization is cumbersome so we employ a stan-
dard trick from the machine learning toolkit. First,
we maximize not the likelihood itself but its logarithm,
logP (A|γ, ω), which gives the same result since the loga-
rithm is a monotone increasing function of its argument
and hence the maximum of the logarithm falls in the
same place as the maximum of the argument. Then we
apply Jensen’s inequality, which says that for any set of
non-negative quantities xi, we have
log
∑
i
xi ≥
∑
i
qi log
xi
qi
, (B4)
where qi is any properly normalized probability distribu-
tion satisfying
∑
i qi = 1. The exact equality is recovered
for the special choice
qi =
xi∑
i xi
. (B5)
Applying Jensen’s inequality to the log of Eq. (B2), we
find that
logP (A|γ, ω) = log
∑
c
eL (c) ≥
∑
c
q(c) log
eL (c)
q(c)
=
∑
ijrs
qijrs
[
aij logωrs − didjωrs
]−∑
c
q(c) log q(c),
(B6)
where we have made use of Eq. (B3) for the log-
likelihood L (c). Here q(c) is any properly-normalized
probability distribution we choose over community as-
signments c, and qijrs is the probability within that distri-
bution that nodes i and j belong to communities r and s
respectively, thus:
qijrs =
∑
c
δci,rδcj ,s q(c). (B7)
Following Eq. (B5), the exact equality in (B6) is estab-
lished, and hence the right-hand side maximized, when
we make the choice
q(c) =
P (A, c|γ, ω)∑
c′ P (A, c
′|γ, ω) =
eL (c)∑
c′ e
L (c′) . (B8)
Thus if we maximize the right-hand side of (B6) over
possible choices of q(c) it becomes equal to the left-hand
side, and if we further maximize the left-hand side with
respect to the parameters γ, ω we get the answer we are
looking for—the values of γ, ω that maximize the overall
likelihood. Put another way, a double maximization of
the right-hand side with respect to both q(c) and ω, γ
will achieve our goal.
At first sight, this appears to make the problem harder:
we have turned what was previously a single maximiza-
tion into a double one. But in fact the double maxi-
mization usefully splits the problem into two parts that
separately are both straightforward, whereas the original
combined problem was difficult. Maximization with re-
spect to q(c) is achieved by making the choice (B8), as
we have said. Maximization with respect to γ and ω can
be achieved by simple differentiation. Note that the final
sum on the right-hand side of Eq. (B6) does not depend
on γ or ω, so it vanishes upon differentiating. Taking
the derivative of the first sum with respect to γr and ωrs
while imposing the constraint (B1) then gives us
γr =
1
n
∑
i
qir, (B9)
and
ωrs =
∑
ij aijq
ij
rs∑
i diq
i
r
∑
j djq
j
s
, (B10)
11
where qir is the probability within the distribution q(c)
that node i belongs to group r:
qir =
∑
c
δci,rq(c) =
∑
s
qijrs, (B11)
the second equality being true for any value of j.
The result is an expectation-maximization or EM al-
gorithm for fitting the model to the observed network,
requiring the simultaneous solution of Eqs. (B8), (B9),
and (B10), which is accomplished by simple iteration.
We first choose initial values of the parameters γ and ω,
for instance at random, and use them to calculate the
probability distribution q(c) from Eq. (B8). Then we use
that distribution to calculate qijrs and q
i
r from Eqs. (B7)
and (B11), and thence to calculate improved estimates
of the parameters from Eqs. (B9) and (B10). Then we
recalculate q(c) again, and repeat until convergence is
reached.
The end product is a set of best-fit values of the param-
eters to the observed network data. In addition to this,
however, and crucially for our purposes, we also calcu-
late a converged value of the distribution q(c), which,
from Eq. (B8), is equal to
q(c) =
P (A, c|γ, ω)∑
c′ P (A, c
′|γ, ω) =
P (A, c|γ, ω)
P (A|γ, ω) = P (c|A, γ, ω).
(B12)
In other words, q(c) is the posterior distribution over
community assignments, the probability, given the ob-
served data A and the best-fit parameter values, of any
particular division c of the network into communities.
The final step of the calculation is then to assign each
node to the community for which it has the highest prob-
ability of membership, which is also equivalent to choos-
ing the community for which qir is maximized. This gives
us our best division of the network into communities or
submarkets.
2. Expected degree
A key feature of the degree-corrected block model is
its ability to provide a good fit to networks with broad
distributions of node degree (the degree of a node in a
network being the number of connections it has to other
nodes). Most empirical networks, including our messag-
ing networks, have widely varying values of node degree
and any model we fit to such networks must, at a mini-
mum, be capable of capturing this variation.
The actual degree of a node in our model network can
fluctuate from one realization of the model to another,
since the model contains random elements. But the ex-
pected value of the degree of node i, for the best-fit val-
ues of the parameters γ, ω given in Eqs. (B9) and (B10),
is always equal to the degree di of the same node in
the observed network. Thus the fitted network fits the
degree distribution exactly apart from fluctuations. To
see this, observe that the expected degree of node i in
the model is equal to the sum of the expected num-
ber of edges didjωci,cj between node i and every other
node
∑
j didjωci,cj , averaged over the distribution q(c)
of community assignments, thus:∑
c
q(c)
∑
j
didjωci,cj =
∑
c
q(c)
∑
j
didj
∑
rs
δci,rδcj ,sωrs
=
∑
jrs
qijrsdidjωrs, (B13)
where we have made use of Eq. (B7). Most nodes j, how-
ever, will be far from node i in a large network, so that
the community assignments of i and j are essentially un-
correlated. This means that qijrs = q
i
rq
j
s and the expected
degree becomes
di
∑
rs
qirωrs
∑
j
qjsdj = di
∑
rs
qir
∑
ij aijq
ij
rs∑
k dkq
k
r
= di
∑
r
qir
∑
ij aijq
i
r∑
k dkq
k
r
= di
∑
r
qir
∑
i diq
i
r∑
k dkq
k
r
= di
∑
r
qir
= di, (B14)
where we have made use of Eq. (B10) in the first equal-
ity, Eq. (B11) in the second, and the trivial observation∑
j aij = di in the third.
3. Belief propagation and the calculation of the
posterior distribution
Elegant though the EM algorithm is for the community
detection problem, it is not (yet) a workable method, be-
cause for all but the very smallest of networks is it not fea-
sible to evaluate the posterior distribution q(c) directly
from Eq. (B8)—the number of possible values of c is sim-
ply too large. The number of possible divisions of n nodes
into k communities is kn, so a division of 10 000 nodes
into, say, four communities would have 410000 ' 106000
possible divisions, which is far more than can be enu-
merated by even the most powerful computer. Within
the statistical literature, the standard way of circumvent-
ing this problem is to approximate the distribution q(c)
using Markov chain Monte Carlo importance sampling,
and that could be done here too. In our work, however,
we use a recently-proposed alternative approach based
on belief propagation [40, 58, 59], which is significantly
more efficient for the particular problem at hand.
The belief propagation method focuses on a quan-
tity µi→jr , called the belief, which is equal to the (poste-
rior) probability that node i belongs to community r if
we are not told whether there is an edge between nodes i
and j, i.e., if we are given the entire adjacency matrix A
except for the element aij . The omission of this one ma-
trix element is crucial to the method: it allows us to
write a self-consistent set of equations for the beliefs that
can be solved by numerical iteration. For the degree-
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corrected block model used here, the appropriate equa-
tions have been given by Yan et al. [59]:
µi→jr =
γr
Zi→j
exp
(
−
∑
k
didk
∑
s
ωrsq
k
s
) ∏
k(6=j)
aik=1
ωrsµ
k→i
s ,
(B15)
where Zi→j is a normalizing constant with value
Zi→j = γr
∑
r
exp
(
−
∑
k
didk
∑
s
ωrsq
k
s
) ∏
k( 6=j)
aik=1
ωrsµ
k→i
s ,
(B16)
and qir is the one-node marginal posterior probability
of node i belonging to group r defined previously in
Eq. (B11). This probability can itself be calculated di-
rectly from the beliefs according to
qir =
γr
Zi
exp
(
−
∑
k
didk
∑
s
ωrsq
k
s
) ∏
k
aik=1
ωrsµ
k→i
s ,
(B17)
with
Zi = γr
∑
r
exp
(
−
∑
k
didk
∑
s
ωrsq
k
s
) ∏
k
aik=1
ωrsµ
k→i
s .
(B18)
The belief propagation calculation involves choosing an
initial set of values for the beliefs and the one-node prob-
abilities (for instance at random in the interval [0, 1]),
using them first to calculate new values of the qir from
Eqs. (B17) and (B18), and then using those values, plus
the beliefs, to calculate new values of the beliefs from
Eqs. (B15) and (B16). Then we repeat the procedure,
iterating until the beliefs converge.
This gives a set of beliefs for the current values of the
parameters γ, ω. Returning to the EM algorithm, we
then use those values to compute improved estimates of
the parameters from Eqs. (B9) and (B10). To do this,
we first need to calculate the two-node marginal proba-
bilities qijrs from the beliefs, which we do as follows.
Note that qijrs appears only in the sum in the numerator
of Eq. (B10) and that the sum involves only the values
of qijrs for node pairs i, j that are connected by an edge.
(Those not connected by an edge have aij = 0 and hence
do not appear in the sum.) For pairs connected by an
edge, qijrs is by definition equal to
qijrs = P (ci = r, cj = s|aij = 1, A′)
= P (aij = 1|ci = r, cj = s,A′)P (ci = r, cj = s|A
′)
P (aij = 1|A′) ,
(B19)
where the parameters γ, ω are assumed given in each
probability and A′ denotes the set of elements of the
adjacency matrix excluding aij (which is specified sepa-
rately). But each term in this expression is now straight-
forward to write in terms of quantities we already know.
The probability P (aij = 1|ci = r, cj = s,A′) is just the
likelihood of the edge from i to j, which for our stochastic
block model is
P (aij = 1|ci = r, cj = s,A′) = didjωr,se−didjωrs . (B20)
Since ωrs is typically very small, it is usually acceptable
to neglect the exponential. (Recall that we are only inter-
ested in assigning each vertex to the highest-probability
community, so small errors in the probabilities typically
make no difference to the final answer.) And the prob-
ability that ci = r given A
′ is precisely the belief µi→jr ,
so
P (ci = r, cj = s|A′) = µi→jr µj→is . (B21)
The probability P (aij = 1|A′) is fixed by the require-
ment of normalization, meaning it can be calculated by
stipulating that
∑
rs q
ij
rs = 1. The end result is
qijrs =
didjωrsµ
i→j
r µ
j→i
s∑
rs didjωrsµ
i→j
r µ
j→i
s
. (B22)
Substituting this value into Eq. (B10) now gives us our
new value for ωrs.
Our final, combined EM/belief propagation algorithm
now consists of the following steps:
1. We choose initial values of the parameters γr and
ωrs for all r, s, for instance at random.
2. We choose initial values of the beliefs µi→jr and one-
node marginal probabilities qir, for instance at ran-
dom.
3. We iterate the belief propagation equations,
(B15) to (B18), to convergence to give values for
the beliefs µi→jr and the one-node marginal proba-
bilities qir.
4. We use these values to calculate the two-node prob-
abilities qijrs from Eq. (B22).
5. We use the one- and two-node probabilities to cal-
culate improved estimates of γr and ωrs for all r, s
from Eqs. (B9) and (B10).
6. We repeat steps 3 to 5 until the parameters and
probabilities converge.
7. We assign each node to the community r for which
its probability of membership qir is highest.
4. Number of submarkets
When applied to the networks of heterosexual dating
studied here, the algorithm of the previous section finds
clear community structure. In fact, there are two differ-
ent types of structure found, one essentially trivial, the
other not. The trivial structure is a division between men
13
20
30
40
50
60
A
ge
 (y
ea
rs
)
3 groups 4 groups 5 groups 6 groups
FIG. 5: Box plots of the age ranges within submarkets for
divisions of the New York City user population into three,
four, five, and six submarkets. For clarity, men and women
are combined in each submarket in this plot, but a similar
pattern is seen when one examines the ages of men and women
separately.
and women. Almost all messages on the web site between
heterosexual users looking for romantic relationships are
between a man and a woman—well over 99%. Very few
are between two men or two women. Our algorithm read-
ily perceives this structure, reliably dividing the network
into men and women without the need for us to iden-
tify the sexes explicitly. This “disassortative” structure
is characterized by a matrix ωrs of probabilities that has
almost all of its weight off the diagonal (most connec-
tions are between different groups) and virtually none on
the diagonal (connections between members of the same
group).
In addition to this trivial structure, however, there is
also the nontrivial group structure that we refer to as
submarkets—the tendency of the population to break up
into distinct communities of dating with relatively little
message traffic between communities.
A practical upshot of this is that if we wish to divide
our network into, say, four submarkets, we must actually
instruct our algorithm to look for twice this number of
communities (i.e., eight). If we do this, then it reliably
finds four submarkets, each further divided into men and
women.
In the calculations presented in Section II B we chose
to divide each city into four submarkets, but divisions
into other numbers of submarkets would also be reason-
able. To explore the effect of varying the number of
submarkets we have performed divisions of the networks
into various numbers of communities. Figure 5 shows
the results of several possible divisions of the New York
network. (Similar patterns are seen in the other three
cities.) The panels of the figure show the age distribu-
tion (men and women combined) for divisions into three,
four, five, and six submarkets (which means six, eight,
ten, and twelve communities in total, once the trivial di-
vision between men and women is factored in). As we
can see, the primary effect of increasing the number of
submarkets is to divide the population into more closely
spaced age ranges, so that divisions into larger numbers
of groups give a finer, more granular, picture of the mar-
ket structure but the same overall behavior. As with all
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FIG. 6: Fractions of men and women in each submarket for di-
visions of the New York City dating market into three, four,
five, and six submarkets. The systematic pattern, seen in
Fig. 2B, in which the ratio of men to women becomes pro-
gressively more female-heavy as we move into the older sub-
markets, is duplicated in each case here, demonstrating that
this is a general behavior, and is not particular to any one
choice of the number of submarkets.
statistical analyses in which data are divided into bins,
there is a balance to be struck between larger numbers of
bins, which gives finer detail in the analysis, and smaller
numbers of bins, which gives better statistics. Our choice
of four submarkets per city gives a good picture of the
overall behavior while maintaining sufficient statistical
power for accurate analysis of the population within sub-
markets.
The systematic variation of the ratio of numbers of
men and women among submarkets seen in Fig. 2B also
extends to divisions into other numbers of submarkets,
as shown in Fig. 6. As the figure shows, the pattern
for the four-way division of Fig. 2B, whereby the sex ra-
tio becomes progressively more female-heavy as we move
into the older submarkets, is duplicated for divisions into
three, five, and six submarkets as well.
Appendix C: Additional analyses and results
In Section II B we observed that minority women tend
to be younger than white women in the same submarket,
a trend that is particularly noticeable for black women.
While the pattern holds across all of our four cities, it is
most pronounced in Chicago. Here we provide additional
details on the racial composition of Chicago users and in-
sight into processes that give rise to the age differences we
observe between white and black women in Chicago. We
also examine whether the patterns observed in Chicago
hold in New York, the other city with a sizable black
population.
Figure 7 shows the mix of ethnicities for men and
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FIG. 7: Racial composition of submarkets in Chicago. All
submarkets are predominantly white, which is consistent with
the overall composition of the Chicago market. However, de-
spite the fact that whites are older, on average, than other
racial groups, they are disproportionately concentrated in
submarket 2. Black users, especially black women, are over-
represented in the older submarkets. Figure 3 suggests one
mechanism driving these patterns.
women in each Chicago submarket. The predominant
group in all submarkets is whites, which reflects the
overall composition of the Chicago user base. There
is, however, systematic variation in the relative size of
the minority population across submarkets. Black men
and women are more prevalent in the oldest submar-
kets, which is surprising given that they are slightly
younger, on average, than their white counterparts. One
factor driving this is that the black women messaged
by both black and white men are, on average, signifi-
cantly younger than the white women messaged by men
in the same submarket, and this phenomenon is most
pronounced in the oldest submarkets. This tends to pull
younger women into the older submarkets, and with them
the men that they exchanges messages with. This helps
explain not only why there is a surplus of black women
in the oldest submarket, but also why these women are
significantly younger, on average, than white women in
the same submarket.
Figure 8 extends our analysis of age differences in mes-
saging by submarket and race (Fig. 3) to Boston and
Seattle. The pattern is similar overall to that for New
York and Chicago: age differences tend to be larger for
first messages than for replies, and also larger in older
submarkets. In submarket 4, for example, white men ini-
tiate contact with Asian women who are around 6 years
younger than themselves on average, but receive replies
from women who are only around 3.5 years younger. Also
in line with the patterns for New York and Chicago, we
see that within a given submarket non-white women tend
to receive messages from older men than do white women;
this is especially true in submarket 4.
There are, however, also some striking differences be-
tween the results for Seattle and Boston and those for
New York and Chicago. In Boston and Seattle, women
in submarket 4 (and for Seattle submarket 3 as well) dis-
play little tolerance for overtures from much older men.
Note how in these cities women’s replies are predomi-
nantly to men of similar age to themselves, despite the
fact that men are messaging significantly younger women.
Black women in Seattle for example are receiving over-
tures from black men about 3.5 years older than them-
selves on average, but reply primarily to men of about
their own age. Notable exceptions to this behavior are
messages from Asian men to Asian women, and from His-
panic men to Hispanic women, which appear to receive
replies despite large average age differences.
X
X
FIG. 8: Mean difference in years between the age of men of
varying races in Seattle and Boston (vertical axis) and the
women they message, by race of women and submarket (hor-
izontal axis). Race is coded as: A = Asian, B = black, H =
Hispanic, and W = white. The first two rows show the av-
erage age difference for, respectively, all initial messages sent
in Boston and those that received a reply. The bottom two
rows show the same patterns for Seattle. We observe zero in-
stances in Boston where black women receive messages from
Asian men in submarket 2, so these cells are marked with
an X.
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